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In the quantum-Bayesian approach to quantum foundations, a quantum state is viewed as an
expression of an agent’s personalist Bayesian degrees of belief, or probabilities, concerning the results
of measurements. These probabilities obey the usual probability rules as required by Dutch-book
coherence, but quantum mechanics imposes additional constraints upon them. In this paper, we
explore the question of deriving the structure of quantum-state space from a set of assumptions
in the spirit of quantum Bayesianism. The starting point is the representation of quantum states
induced by a symmetric informationally complete measurement or SIC. In this representation, the
Born rule takes the form of a particularly simple modification of the law of total probability. We
show how to derive key features of quantum-state space from (i) the requirement that the Born rule
arises as a simple modification of the law of total probability and (ii) a limited number of additional
assumptions of a strong Bayesian flavor.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the standard formulation of (finite-dimensional)
quantum mechanics, a quantum state is a density opera-
tor, ρ, on a d-dimensional Hilbert space. A measurement
withm outcomes is described by a POVM, {E1, . . . , Em},
a collection of positive semi-definite operators that sum
to the identity. The probability, p(i), of the i-th mea-
surement outcome is given by the Born rule,
p(i) = tr (ρEi) . (1)
If the POVM {Ei} is informationally complete [1], the
state ρ is fully determined by the outcome probabilities
{p(i)}. With respect to some fiducial informationally
complete POVM, the vector of probabilities p(i) is thus
an alternative description of the quantum state. This
means that quantum-state space can be viewed as a sub-
set of the probability simplex.
According to the quantum-Bayesian approach to quan-
tum foundations [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12], the
probabilities p(i) represent an agent’s Bayesian degrees of
belief, or personalist probabilities [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18].
They are numbers expressing the agent’s uncertainty
about which measurement outcome will occur and ac-
quire an operational meaning through decision theory
[17]. Quantum-Bayesian state assignments are person-
alist in the sense that they are functions of the agent
alone, not functions of the world external to the agent
[8]. In other words, there are—in principle—potentially
as many quantum states for a given quantum system as
there are agents who care to take note of it. Nonethe-
less, despite not being specified by agent-independent
facts, personalist probability assignments are far from ar-
bitrary. Dutch-book coherence [13, 16, 18] as a normative
principle requires that an agent’s degrees of belief con-
form to the usual rules of the probability calculus, and
this is a surprisingly powerful constraint when coupled
with the agent’s overall belief system [19].
In addition to the rules required by Dutch-book co-
herence, the Born rule (1) puts further constraints on
the probabilities used in quantum mechanics. From this
arises two questions which are of central importance for
the quantum-Bayesian program. One question, on which
there has been much progress recently [12, 20, 21], is that
of the mathematical structure of the set of probabilities
resulting from Eq. (1). The second question concerns
the origin of the quantum-mechanical constraints on the
agent’s probabilities, i.e., the origin of the Born rule. The
authors’ present view on this question is that the Born
rule should be seen as an empirical addition to Dutch-
book coherence [12].
What we mean by this is the following. Dutch-book
coherence, though a normative rule, is of a purely logical
character [22]. The way Bernardo and Smith [17] put its
significance is this:
Bayesian Statistics offers a rationalist theory of
personalistic beliefs in contexts of uncertainty,
with the central aim of characterising how an
individual should act in order to avoid certain
kinds of undesirable behavioural inconsistencies.
. . . The goal, in effect, is to establish rules and
procedures for individuals concerned with disci-
plined uncertainty accounting. The theory is not
descriptive, in the sense of claiming to model ac-
tual behaviour. Rather, it is prescriptive, in the
sense of saying ‘if you wish to avoid the possibil-
ity of these undesirable consequences you must
act in the following way.’
On the other hand, to a quantum Bayesian it is crucial
that there is no such thing as a “right and true” quantum
state [8]. But if so, what is one to make of the Born rule
in Eq. (1)? What are these things ρ and Ei that the prob-
abilities are being calculated from? The meaning of the
2rule calls for an explanation in our terms. Our solution is
to think of the Born rule in a normative way, rather than
as a strict law of nature. It is something along the lines,
but not identical to, Dutch-book coherence: The Born
rule should be viewed as a normative principle for relat-
ing one’s various degrees of belief about the outcomes of
various measurements. The idea is that if one does not
make sure his probability assignments are related accord-
ing to the dictum of the Born rule, nature is liable to give
“undesirable consequences” for his decisions. In contrast
to usual Dutch-book coherence, though, the origin of the
normative rule is not of a purely logical character. It
should rather be seen as dependent upon contingent fea-
tures of the particular physical world we happen to live
in.
To shed further light on the similarities and differ-
ences between Dutch book coherence and the Born rule,
here we renew the question of deriving the structure of
quantum-state space from a set of assumptions formu-
lated and motivated fully in terms of the probability as-
signments of a Bayesian agent. In Section III we show one
way to derive several key features of quantum-state space
from the assumption that the Born rule arises as a sim-
ple modification of the law of total probability, comple-
mented by a few further assumptions of a strong Bayesian
character. Many details of the derivation are left out
since a full account can be found in [12]. Indeed the role
of the present paper should be viewed as a supplement to
the (very long) [12]. Here we try to be as logically crisp
as possible, deleting extended examples and motivations,
and very carefully labeling every assumption.
The set of assumptions in Section III was inspired by
the observation that the mapping between the Hilbert
space and probability simplex formulations of quantum
mechanics becomes very simple if the fiducial POVM is
a symmetric informationally complete POVM, or SIC
[23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28]. In particular, in this representa-
tion the Born rule takes the form of an extremely simple
modification of the law of total probability [12], thus mo-
tivating our main assumption in Section III. This moti-
vation will be explained in Section II, where we prepare
the ground for the rest of the paper by reviewing SICs
briefly and showing how to rewrite the Born rule in terms
of them.
II. SICS AND THE BORN RULE
Consider a set of d2 one-dimensional projection oper-
ators, Πi, in d-dimensional Hilbert space such that
tr ΠiΠj =
dδij + 1
d+ 1
. (2)
The informationally complete POVM {Ei} defined by
Ei =
1
d
Πi is called a SIC [24]. SICs have been explic-
itly proven to exist in dimensions d = 2–15, 19, and 24
(see references in [29]). Furthermore, they have been ob-
served by computational means, to a numerical precision
of 10−38, in dimensions d = 2–67 [29]. For this paper, we
will assume that SICs exist in all dimensions.
With respect to a SIC, a density operator can be re-
covered easily from the outcome probabilities given by
the Born rule (1) by using the beautiful formula [24, 26]
ρ =
d2∑
i=1
(
(d+ 1)p(i)− 1
d
)
Πi . (3)
Using this equation one can show that, in the represen-
tation induced by a fiducial SIC, the set of all quantum
states can be characterized very elegantly. According to
one such characterization, a probability vector p(i) is a
pure quantum state if and only if it satisfies the con-
straints [28]
∑
i
p(i)2 =
2
d(d+ 1)
(4)
and
∑
ijk
cijk p(i)p(j)p(k) =
d+ 7
(d+ 1)3
, (5)
where the coefficients cijk are defined by
cijk = Re tr
(
ΠiΠjΠk
)
. (6)
All other quantum states, which means all mixed states,
are constructed by taking convex combinations of the
states given by Eqs. (4) and (5). A key question for the
quantum Bayesian program is how to understand and
motivate the structure of quantum-state space expressed
in these equations as restrictions on an agent’s personalist
probability assignments.
A strong hint as to where to look for an answer is given
by the surprising form the Born rule takes when written
in SIC language. Consider the scenario in Figure 1, where
one measurement (which we call the “measurement on
the ground”) is analyzed in terms of another measure-
ment (the “measurement in the sky”), and assume for
the time being that the measurement in the sky is a SIC,
implying that it has n = d2 outcomes. The probabilities
p(i) are thus a representation of the agent’s prior state
assignment. The conditional probabilities r(j|i) are the
agent’s probabilities to obtain outcome j on the ground
assuming that the measurement in the sky was actually
performed and resulted in outcome i.
Let us now denote by s(j) the agent’s probabilities for
the outcomes of the measurement on the ground in this
situation, i.e., when the measurement in the sky was ac-
tually carried out before the measurement on the ground.
Dutch-book coherence requires that the agent computes
s(j) from p(i) and r(j|i) by using the law of total prob-
ability,
s(j) =
d2∑
i=1
p(i)r(j|i) . (7)
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FIG. 1: This diagram shows the conceptual framework of this
paper. A system is imagined to be measurable in two ways.
The measurement on the ground, with outcomes j = 1, . . . ,m,
is an arbitrary measurement that could be performed in the
laboratory. The measurement in the sky, with outcomes
i = 1, . . . , n, is a fixed fiducial measurement introduced to
analyze the measurement on the ground. The probability
distributions p(i) and r(j|i) represent an agent’s probabili-
ties assuming the measurement in the sky is actually per-
formed. The probability distribution q(j) represents instead
the agent’s probabilities under the assumption that the mea-
surement in the sky is not performed. If the measurement in
the sky is a SIC with n = d2 outcomes, q(j) is related to p(i)
and r(j|i) by the simple relation (8).
If, however, the measurement in the sky is not per-
formed and remains counterfactual, Dutch-book coher-
ence places no constraints on the agent’s probabilities,
denoted by q(j), for the outcomes on the ground. In this
case, it is the quantum formalism through the Born rule
that restricts the agent’s distribution q(j). This follows
easily by setting q(j) = tr ρFj and r(j|i) = trΠiFj for
some general POVM {Fj} with m outcomes and using
Eq. (3). One obtains
q(j) =
d2∑
i=1
(
(d+ 1)p(i)− 1
d
)
r(j|i) . (8)
This is the Born rule q(j) = tr ρFj expressed in the
SIC representation. As in Ref. [12] we stress the cen-
tral importance of this equation by calling it the Urglei-
chung. The similarity with the law of total probability is
striking—it is basically the simplest modification of that
law that it could possibly be [30]. To get from the law of
total probability to the Urgleichung, one merely makes
the replacement
∑
i
p(i)r(j|i) −→
∑
i
f
(
p(i)
)
r(j|i) , (9)
with f simply an affine mapping, f(x) = (d + 1)x − 1
d
.
The functional form of the Born rule expressed by the
Urgleichung will be the pivot for the development in the
next section.
III. DERIVING THE STRUCTURE OF
QUANTUM-STATE SPACE
In this section, the main section of the paper, we for-
mulate a series of assumptions from which a number of
key features of the structure of quantum-state space can
be derived. As stated previously we omit many of the
mechanical details of the proofs for greater clarity. The
omitted details can be found in [12]. The basic situation
we consider is as in Figure 1. We imagine a fiducial, coun-
terfactual n-outcome measurement “in the sky” in terms
of which we analyze an arbitrary m-outcome measure-
ment “on the ground.” Initially there are no restrictions
on the numbers n andm. As before, p(i), the prior in the
sky, represents the probabilities in the sky, and q(j) rep-
resents the probabilities on the ground. We write r(j|i)
to represent the conditional probability for obtaining j
on the ground, given that i was found in the sky. When
we want to suppress components, we will write vectors
‖p〉〉 and ‖q〉〉, and write R for the matrix with entries
r(j|i)—by definition, R is a stochastic matrix.
We start by postulating a generalized Urgleichung
where we take the mapping f in Eq. (9) to be a gen-
eral affine mapping f(x) = αx − β.
Assumption 1: Generalized Urgleichung. For any
measurement on the ground, q(j) should be calculated ac-
cording to
q(j) =
n∑
i=1
(
αp(i)− β)r(j|i) , (10)
where α and β are fixed nonnegative real numbers.
Since the q(j) are probabilities, they satisfy the double
inequality 0 ≤ q(j) ≤ 1 or
0 ≤
n∑
i=1
(
αp(i)− β)r(j|i) ≤ 1 . (11)
We call this double inequality the Urungleichung. It
puts immediate restrictions on the distributions p(i) and
r(j|i), i.e., on the vector ‖p〉〉 and the matrix R. For an
agent to accept quantum mechanics it means, at least
in part, he commits to these restrictions on his Bayesian
probability assignments. Our ultimate goal—which in
this paper we will achieve only partially—is the precise
characterization of these restrictions in Bayesian terms.
4We will denote by P0 the set of all priors for the sky
permitted by quantum mechanics, and by R0 the set of
all permitted conditional distributions R. Our next as-
sumption is about the sets P0 and R0. To formulate it,
we need a definition.
Definition 1: Let P be a set of priors in the sky and
let R be a set of stochastic matrices. We say that P and
R are consistent if all pairs (‖p〉〉, R) ∈ P × R obey the
Urungleichung (11). Furthermore, we say P and R are
maximal whenever P ′ ⊇ P and R′ ⊇ R imply P ′ = P
and R′ = R for any consistent P ′ and R′.
Assumption 2: Maximality: The sets P0 and R0 of all
valid priors for the sky and all valid conditionals R are
taken to be consistent and maximal.
In other words, we assume that quantum mechanics re-
stricts the set of probabilities available to the agent as
little as possible given the universal validity of the gen-
eralized Urgleichung (10).
Unfortunately, Assumption 2 does not fix the sets P0
and R0 uniquely. There are many consistent and maxi-
mal pairs (P ,R). The assumptions below constitute one
way to proceed toward the goal of a complete character-
ization of P0 and R0. There is little doubt that there
exist simpler and more compelling sets of assumptions to
achieve this goal. Finding these is work in progress.
Assumption 3: Possibility of complete ignorance: The
constant vector
‖p〉〉 =
(
1
n
,
1
n
, . . . ,
1
n
)T
(12)
is in the set P0.
This assumption makes sure that the agent can be in
a state of complete ignorance about the outcome of the
measurement in the sky.
Assumption 4: Priors span the simplex: The elements
of P span the probability simplex in n dimensions.
If this assumption were not satisfied, one could use a
smaller simplex for all considerations.
Assumption 5: Principle of Reciprocity: For any R ∈
R0 and any outcome j on the ground, the vector ‖p〉〉 with
components
p(i) =
r(j|i)∑
k r(j|k)
(13)
is in the set P0 of valid priors for the sky. Conversely,
all valid priors ‖p〉〉 ∈ P0 can be written in this way.
To motivate this assumption and its name, imagine that
both the measurement in the sky and the measurement
on the ground are performed and the agent learns the
outcome j on the ground while remaining ignorant of
the outcome in the sky. Imagine further that his prior
in the sky before the measurement is given by the state
(12) of complete ignorance. The expression (13) is then
the agent’s posterior probability for the outcome i in the
sky, given the outcome j on the ground, as computed by
Bayes’s rule. The content of the Principle of Reciprocity
is that the set of priors in the sky is equal to the set of
posteriors upon learning the outcome on the ground.
The assumptions so far are very natural and already
lead to a number of interesting consequences [12]. For
instance, it follows immediately from Assumption 1 that
the relation
α = nβ + 1 (14)
holds between the three constants of the generalized Ur-
gleichung (10). Assumption 2 implies that the sets P0
and R0 are both convex, and even compact [21], so that
they necessarily have well-defined extreme points. And
Assumption 5 implies the existence of an important class
of special priors:
Definition 2: Let the measurement on the ground be
identical to the measurement in the sky. Denote the com-
ponents of the matrix R by rs(j|i) in this case. By the
Principle of Reciprocity (Assumption 5), the distributions
‖ek〉〉, k = 1, . . . , n, with components
ek(i) =
rs(k|i)∑
l rs(k|l)
(15)
are in the set P0. They are called basis states.
Using Assumption 4, one can show that these compo-
nents take the form
ek(i) =
1
α
(δki + β) (16)
and satisfy the relation
∑
i
ek(i)
2 =
1
α2
(
1 + 2β + nβ2
)
. (17)
However, to pin down the sets P0 and R0 further, and
in particular to fix the parameterized form of the con-
stants n, α, and β—i.e., that n = d2, α = d + 1, and
β = 1
d
—we need two additional postulates. First here is
another definition.
Definition 3: A measurement on the ground is said to
have the property of in-step unpredictability (ISU) if a
uniform prior in the sky implies a uniform probability as-
signment for the probabilities on the ground, i.e., for an
ISU measurement, whenever ‖p〉〉 is the uniform distribu-
tion (12), then ‖q〉〉 is given by the uniform distribution(
1
m
, 1
m
, . . . , 1
m
)T
.
The existence of ISU measurements, which will be postu-
lated in Assumption 6 below, means that an agent may
5be totally ignorant about both the (counterfactual) out-
come in the sky and the outcome on the ground.
Let us now denote by rISU(j|i) the components of the
matrix R for a measurement on the ground with m out-
comes, m 6= n, and in-step unpredictability. It can be
shown [12] that one must have
∑
i
rISU(j|i) = n
m
. (18)
By the Principle of Reciprocity, this ISU measurement
gives rise to a class of priors which we denote by ‖pk〉〉,
k = 1, . . . ,m. Their components are given by
pk(i) =
m
n
rISU(k|i) ; (19)
each vector ‖pk〉〉 represents a valid prior in the sky. This
leads to our next definition.
Definition 4: We say that a measurement with in-
step unpredictability achieves the ideal of certainty if
‖p〉〉 = ‖pk〉〉 implies that q(j) = δjk, i.e., for such a
measurement and a prior in the sky given by ‖pk〉〉, the
agent is certain that the outcome on the ground will be k.
This is a very specific definition. It is motivated by the
following consideration. Consider a setup with an ISU
measurement on the ground, i.e., a measurement with
total ignorance for both ground and sky, and imagine the
measurement in the sky is actually performed. Observ-
ing k on the ground while remaining ignorant about the
sky then gives rise to the posterior ‖pk〉〉 for the sky (see
the discussion following Assumption 5). Now go back to
the usual situation in which the measurement in the sky
remains counterfactual, and assume the agent’s prior for
the sky is ‖pk〉〉. If the measurement achieves the ideal of
certainty, the agent will be certain that the measurement
on the ground results in the very outcome k.
Assumption 6: Availability of Certainty. For any sys-
tem, there is a measurement with in-step unpredictability
of some number m0 ≥ 2 of outcomes that (i) achieves the
ideal of certainty and (ii) for which one of the priors ‖pk〉〉
defined in Eq. (19) has the form of a basis distribution
(15).
For a measurement of this type, we have that [12]
〈〈pj‖pk〉〉 = 1
α
(m0
n
δjk + β
)
, j, k = 1, . . . ,m0 , (20)
where 〈〈·‖·〉〉 denotes the inner product. Using condition
(ii) of the above assumption, it follows that the squared
norm 〈〈pk‖pk〉〉 of any of the vectors ‖pk〉〉 is equal to the
squared norm of the basis vectors given by Eq. (17). This,
together with Eq. (14) now implies the equality
m0
n
α− β = 1 (21)
for any measurement satisfying Assumption 6.
Equation (20) expresses that any two of the vectors
‖pk〉〉 differ by the same angle, θ, defined by
cos θ =
〈〈p1‖p2〉〉
〈〈p1‖p1〉〉 . (22)
Using the relations (14) and (21) between our four vari-
ables, α, β, n and m0 established above, this angle can
be seen to equal
cos θ =
n−m0
(m0 − 1)2 + n− 1 . (23)
We are now ready to state our last assumption.
Assumption 7: Many Systems, Universal Angle. The
identity of a system is parameterized by its pair (n,m0).
Nonetheless for all systems, the angle θ between pairs
of priors ‖pk〉〉 for any measurement satisfying Assump-
tion 6 is a universal constant given by cos θ = 1/2.
The value cos θ = 1/2 is less arbitrary than it may appear
at first sight. Taken by itself, the assumption that θ is
universal implies that, for anym0 ≥ 2, there is an integer
n such that the right-hand side of Eq. (23) evaluates to
the constant cos θ. It is not hard to show that this is
possible only if this constant is of the form
cos θ =
q
q + 2
, (24)
where q is a non-negative integer. The universal angle
postulated above corresponds to the choice q = 2.
Every choice for q leads to a different relation between
n and m0. For q = 0, we find n = m0, in which case the
Urgleichung turns out to be identical to the classical law
of total probability. For q = 1, we get the relationship
n = 1
2
m0(m0 +1) which, although this fact plays no role
in our argument, is characteristic of theories defined in
real Hilbert space [31]. And for q = 2, we obtain
n = m2
0
. (25)
Equations (21) and (25) hold for the special measure-
ment postulated in Assumption 6. If we eliminate m0
from these equations we find, with the help of Eq. (14),
the relationships
n = (α− 1)2 , β = 1√
n
. (26)
These equalities form the main result of this paper. They
must hold for any measurement on the ground. If we
denote the integer α − 1 by the letter d, we recover the
constants of the original Urgleichung (8).
With the Urgleichung in the form (8) as the start-
ing point and minimal additional assumptions, a large
amount of detailed information about the structure of
quantum-state space can be derived. Details can be
found in Ref. [12] and the paper by Appleby, Ericsson,
and Fuchs [21] in this special issue.
6IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Our main postulate, the generalized Urgleichung or As-
sumption 1, is an addition to standard Dutch-book co-
herence. It restricts an agent’s probability assignments in
a situation involving a counterfactual measurement—the
measurement in the sky—where Dutch-book coherence
does not impose any specific constraints. The form of the
generalized Urgleichung is given by a minimal modifica-
tion of the law of total probability, which is the law con-
necting the agent’s probabilities in the case the measure-
ment in the sky is factualized, i.e., actually carried out.
This means that the key assumption of this paper arises
through a formal connection between an agent’s proba-
bilities in two complementary scenarios, one in which the
measurement in the sky remains counterfactual and one
in which it is factualized.
Assumption 2 guarantees that the set of probability
assignments available to the agent is maximal within the
constraints set by the generalized Urgleichung, i.e., As-
sumption 2 makes sure that the agent’s probability as-
signments are not unduly restricted. In a similar spirit,
Assumption 3 guarantees that the state of complete igno-
rance is among the agent’s potential priors, and Assump-
tion 4 makes sure that the set of priors available to the
agent is large enough to span the probability simplex.
With Assumption 5, the Principle of Reciprocity, we
return to the theme of exploring connections between the
two respective scenarios of a counterfactual and a factu-
alized measurement in the sky. The Principle of Reci-
procity states that the set of priors for the sky available
to the agent should be identical to the set of the agent’s
posteriors for a factualized measurement in the sky. The
question of what motivates the particular relation be-
tween probabilities for counterfactual and factualizable
measurements expressed in Assumptions 1 and 5 strikes
us as a mysterious and important one.
The numerical relation between the constants α, β, and
n, and in particular the fact that n is a perfect square,
follows from the existence of a single special measurement
defined in Assumption 6, together with the postulate of a
universal angle in Assumption 7. These last two assump-
tions, as well as the first five, are given purely in terms
of the personalist probabilities a Bayesian agent may as-
sign to the outcomes of certain experiments. Nowhere in
all this do we mention amplitudes, Hilbert space, or any
other part of the usual apparatus of quantum mechan-
ics. What has been sketched in this paper constitutes
a novel approach to the quantum formalism, providing
fresh insight for the foundations of quantum mechanics.
Maybe even more importantly, the success of this ap-
proach provides a compelling case for quantum Bayesian-
ism [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12].
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